Abstract-Data with high security requirements is being processed and stored with increasing frequency in the Cloud. To guarantee that the data is being dealt in a secure manner we investigate the applicability of Assurance methodologies. In a typical Cloud environment the setup of multiple layers and different stakeholders determines security properties of individual components that are used to compose Cloud applications. We present a methodology adapted from Common Criteria for aggregating information reflecting the security properties of individual constituent components of Cloud applications. This aggregated information is used to categorise overall application security in terms of Assurance Levels and to provide a continuous assurance level evaluation. It gives the service owner an overview of the security of his service, without requiring detailed manual analyses of log files.
INTRODUCTION
An important transformation process in IT systems is currently taking place triggered by the rapid propagation of the Cloud Computing paradigm across distinct domains and organisations. Hence it is envisaged that ICT services will in future be delivered in a manner similar to utilities such as water, electricity, gas, and telephony. The main motivation for adopting Cloud technology is to increase efficiency and minimize IT costs by offering new concepts such as elasticity, scalability and on-demand resource provisioning. However, in order to automatically provision resources for elastically adaptive Cloud applications it requires both, the applications and the underlying platform to be constantly monitored to capture information at various system and operational levels and time intervals. This is particularly manifested in Critical Infrastructures, which require even more attention when these systems are hosted on top of Cloud environments.
However, the use of Cloud computing has introduced new risks that have to be sufficiently understood before an organisation should consider adopting the Cloud and using Cloud services. Moreover, due to the complexity of the application execution environment, routine tasks such as monitoring or security analysis becomes quite complex. These tasks often require close interaction and assessment between different layers of the Cloud stack. For example, certain distributed applications running within a Cloud cluster on specific virtual machine(s) (VM) require a general assurance, or even have to be certified, for maintaining specific security properties. This might also require monitoring the execution of the application on the VMs, as well as monitoring the availability of the physical resources of the VMs. Thus, this would require the use of different tool sets to collect and analyse the performance of data from each level in order to reach the point where the application can be certified.
Under these circumstances, we should gather different types of information at various levels of granularity, from lowlevel system metrics (e.g. CPU usage, network traffic, memory allocation, etc.) to high-level application specific metrics (e.g. throughput, latency, availability, etc.). These are collected across multiple system layers (physical, virtualization, application level) in a Cloud environment at different time intervals. Hence, the challenge in this case is to define a way to aggregate these different types of information from different levels in order to provide an overall assurance, and determine how changes in individual assurance levels of every component affects the overall assurance.
In this paper, we propose, based on existing work [10] an assurance method. We refer to assurance, motivated by common criteria, as the likelihood for a service falling victim to a cyber-attack. A high assurance level means a low probability for this to happen. Security properties, based on measurable metrics, of substituent components contribute to the overall assurance level and how they are aggregated is subject to dependency policies. This is based on a comprehensive concept for assessing security properties across multiple layers with different stakeholders for composite based systems. The dependency policies, can be flexibly adopted according to various use case requirements to derive evaluation of every individual component of a service or a system. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines the related work. Section III describes our approach and introduces the Assurance Assessment Method, the way we define assurance levels, how we abstract the service as a general tree, and the assurance aggregation process. In Section IV the evaluation of the approach is provided based on a Use Case Scenario. Finally, section V provides concluding remarks and directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Traditional approaches for assurance assessment in the Cloud, such as Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [12] , Information Technology Assurance Framework (ITAF) [17] , or the Cloud Computing Information Assurance Framework from ENISA [18] , are usually built on existing frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27000-series (e.g. current work in progress ISO/IEC 27017 and ISO/IEC 27018 which are focusing on information security and data protection in Cloud), PCI DSS Cloud Guideline [13] , COBIT [14] , NIST [16] , or IT Baseline Protection Catalogues [15] .
We have considered existing approaches, namely the Common Criteria framework [6] for assurance of IT systems (as it is the most dominant work in the field) and extended it [10] since its main focus is on assessing assurance in the development phase of the life cycle but lacks support in the subsequent production phase.
Unlike traditional approaches, the work derived from Krotsiani et.al. [11] proposes a novel approach for certifying the security of Cloud services based on incremental certification of security properties for different types of Cloud services (including IaaS, PaaS and SaaS services). This approach uses operational evidence from the services provisioning through continuous monitoring. Although the model does not directly address assurance as an explicit objective, it can be adopted to efficiently assess assurance at various levels and time intervals.
Our approach is related to autonomic monitoring systems that are based on the SECCRIT architecture model [7] and on an evidence-gathering model for assurance assessment in critical infrastructures hosted on top of Cloud environments (as introduced in [8] ). Moreover, we found our concepts on the Common Criteria approach for analysing and assessing application in preproduction phases. However, we emphasize the importance of observing systems in their production phase, as well as their dependencies with other corresponding elements inside of heterogeneous systems 1 
III. MULTI LAYER ASSURANCE ASSESMENT MODEL
. The popular National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [3] model depicts the Cloud architecture through a dynamic tree-layered service-provisioning model (infrastructure, platform and software -as a Service layer) capable of scaling services across distinct administrative and legislative domains. However, the common practices for provisioning and delivering services (as well as the abstraction of those layers and driven technologies) differentiates based on the business objectives of a particular Cloud provider. Hence, the traditional assessment frameworks (e.g. COBIT, ISO 27000 series) are not fully applicable, especially when addressing security related concerns in Cloud environments (as discussed in [10] ).
However, in order to build a comprehensive and flexible framework that is able to acquire heterogeneous information across the Cloud stack the following objectives have to be addressed:
• cross layer assessment • technology independence • information acquisition restrictions • assessment, quantification and aggregation of different information sets
The assessment of such services when taking into account different Cloud layers requires a compact solution, able to embrace all requirements and produce an effective assessment tool. Especially when considering different stakeholders, various business and security objectives, a high degree of service complexity, business model, and distinct technologies. Hence, we adopt Common Criteria [6] to address assurance in Cloud related environments. Although, Common Criteria offers a comprehensive solution for assurance assessment, it lacks support for the production phase, especially when referring to those services that are hosted on top of the Cloud architectures. Taking this and the above-mentioned objectives into account, we use the Common Criteria approach in order to address assurance assessment of complex services hosted in Cloud infrastructures. Furthermore, the policies of some Cloud providers restrict information crawling across their Cloud stack (for instance software as a service Cloud provider will hesitate to reveal information about the underlying services being used, in order to mitigate potential attack vectors on its infrastructure). Hence it is harder to analyse, indicate or predict security issues in such environments. Thus, we distinguish two main categories: a) solutions based on open-source Cloud environments (i.e. solutions where we are able to freely acquire necessary information without the approval from the provider; and b) closed Cloud environments with restricted information access (i.e. public Cloud providers which provide any additional information via the Service Level Agreements (SLA) [21] [22] ). Due to the flexibility of acquiring the information and ability to modify services for provisioning the information, this paper focuses primarily on open-source Cloud solutions (e.g. OpenStack [23] , CloudStack [24] ). This does, however, not limit our approach to these environments.
The assessment and aggregation of different information sets (i.e. analysis of a particular entity in the Cloud with respect to a specific set of properties) is derived from the concept of assurance levels, supported through aggregation policies (i.e. decision making algorithms that cluster the security properties of each class towards the predefined assurance levels), aligned with the Common Criteria approach [6] .
A. Assurance assesment method
Considering these objectives and building on the research presented in [10] we propose a comprehensive and flexible approach for performing assurance assessment. The approach is using a well-defined set of security properties, provided by the CUMULUS project [5] . These are additionally aligned with the SECCRIT vulnerability catalogue [20] and The Notorious Nine from Cloud Security Alliance [19] .
Our assessment method emphasises three core assessment entities: Target of Evaluation (ToE), Group of Evaluation (GoE) and Component of Evaluation (CoE). These entities are aligned with the Common Criteria assessment framework, and are therefore designed to offer flexibility, determination of the precise impact of the individual components or group of components, scalability of assessment across different time intervals, and the possibility to highlight ea of the system as an independent po Furthermore, we designed our method as structure defined with parent-child object parent can be in a direct relationship w objects. The parent object that does not hav objects is referred to as leaf object. Ad define associations, dependencies, associa and assurance profiles, as supporting asse the ToE. Figure 1 illustrates the fundamen Assurance Assessment Method. More spec how a particular service can be abstracte hierarchically organized components. We u elements to build our method and to assurance according to a predefined set of derived from the CUMULUS project.
The initial step of the assessment m details the ToE. This can be either an a referred to as service (e.g. a specific service service operations, data managed by the s that is required or contributes to the real service (e.g., a virtual machine).
Moreover, each ToE contains a set of at security objectives, which are mapped tow of security claims and are formally refer Properties (SP); (ii) attributes that define th (e.g. information or system assurance) assurance model presented in [10] ; (iii) a s the ToE; and (iv) the assessment inte objectives are the statements of intent to co ach individual entity int of evaluation. a hierarchical tree t relationship. Each with multiple child ve any related child dditionally, we also ated component sets ssment elements of ntal elements of our cifically, it presents ed through a set of use these abstraction efficiently assess f security properties method defines and asset of the Cloud e operation, a set of service) or an asset lization of a Cloud ttributes such as: (i) wards the related set rred to as Security he type of assurance according to the short description of rval. The security ounter the identified threats by IT measures. Each ToE ToE Ł T = {COE i , i ‫א‬ N} | {GO statement as presented in Figure 1 COE A = {COE i , i ‫א‬ ‫ۃ‬B, C, D, E, F objects, formally referred as Grou defined as GoE = {CoE i , i ‫א‬ N individual objects that share co which the assessment is conducted can be formulated as compound {COE i , i ‫א‬ ‫ۃ‬F, H, I, J‫.}ۄ‬ Each in refer to as the component of ev handled as an independent ToE. E attributes, used for describing a pa profile, which is the essential e associations, an element used to de different groups in the scope of th individual components.
Component Dependency (CD) individual components of the eval {‫ۃ‬COE i , COE j ‫,ۄ‬ i, j ‫א‬N}), that ari self-sufficient and relies upon component, e.g. when referring COE G }. Association is a set of two are in a direct parent-child re dependency, for which it is valid ‫ۃ‬COE i , COE j ‫,ۄ‬ i, j ‫א‬N} ฺ C individual parent object can be ass objects, which we formally refer Set (ACS), for which the following
Last but not least, the Assuran element in our method used to security properties that are mapp (AC) of a particular CoE or GoE will at the end define the level of component, group or even a whole types of Assurance profiles setup (AP U ), which is always the same r object, group or target; and Custo which can be customised dependin In Table 1 we illustrated the AP class. Furthermore, we can also Profile to a particular CoE, GoE or
B. Assurance Levels
Assurance levels (AL) outlin for evaluating predefined ToE, Go CoE or GoE contributes directly t ToE by meeting a set of SPs (i criteria). Moreover, the SPs deriv by also taking into consideratio evaluated object, e.g. component, if such are present. However, each number of SPs) as shown in equa binary decision making concept a the general tree model arget of Evaluation (ToE) on (CoE), whereby each Es, referred as Associated two individual CoEs is a formal compound of to establish assurance of s, these groups are then E can be formally defined as OE i , i ‫א‬ N}. This generalized can be formulated as ToE Ł F, G, H, I, J‫.}ۄ‬ The group of up of Evaluation (GoE) and N}, are a compound set of ommon properties based on d. Considering Figure 1 , GoE d of objects, e.g. GOE 1 = ndividual object to which we valuation (CoE) can be also Each GoE is composed of (i) articular group; (ii) assurance element for evaluation; (iii) escribe relationships between he evaluated target; and (iv) is a correlation between two luated system (i.e where CD ij ses when a component is not the presence of another to Figure 1 CD CG ={COE C , o individual components that elationship with a defined d:
nce profile (AP), an essential define policy related with ped to the Assurance classes E. These security properties f assurance for an individual e system. We emphasize two : Uniform Assurance Profile regardless of class, evaluated om Assurance Profile (AP P ), ng on the object of appliance. P U for a particular assurance assign a custom Assurance r ToE.
ne the scale of measurement oE or CoE. Every individual to the assurance level of the i.e. a certain set of security ve the AL per individual AC on the dependencies of the group or target of evaluation h AC may contain k of SP (k ations (5) and (6) . Due to the applied in our approach there can be 2 k combinations of distinct SP states where 2 k > N, and N is the cardinality of AL, in terms of security properties (AL= {1, 2, 3, 4 … N}). Thus, each individual combinations of SPs {SP 1 , SP 2 , SP 3 , SP 4 … SP N }, associated with a particular AC, are formally referred to as Security Property Vector (SPV) (equations (3, (4, (5, (6) . Security Property Vector defines the current state of an object by identifying particular set of security properties. Each SPV is associated with a particular assurance class (AL), whereby each class can comprise multiple SPVs formally referred as Vector Set (VS) (equation (2)). Thus, in order to scale 2 k states over N assurance levels, we encode ranges in hexadecimal vectors that cluster a potential set of states that correspond to a particular SPV, as shown in Table 1 . Table 1 For each individual AC that is associated with a set of SPVs particular SP (part of SPV) may vary. Nevertheless, every individual AC, regardless of the SPs, always has to have the same cardinality k (equation (5)). In order to efficiently aggregate the assurance across the variety of architectural layers, ACs first has to fulfil the equations (5) and (6) , stating that regardless of the AC, none of the SPs can be associated with more than one AC (equation (7)).
Although, we abstract ALs over N levels, for the purpose of our empirical evaluation we will conduct the assessment over 7 ALs, therefore having minimum 3 SP per AC to be able to map all assurance levels with SPVs. Depending on the property set that a particular entity (i.e. class component, group or even a whole target of evaluation) is assigned with and due to the dynamic behaviour of the Cloud the AL will also be dynamic and vary. Hence, it is crucial to efficiently assess the assurance in a continuous manner without impacting on the performance of the evaluated service or collocated services.
C. Assurance Aggregation
As mentioned above, we propose a concept for the assurance aggregation through a recursive process, which aggregates the individual assurance levels of the underlying associated objects (i.e. it calculates the overall assurance of the components that are associated with the root component). The overall assurance can be derived by applying the method depicted in Figure 1 . Further, by conducting the proposed algorithm described in Figure 4 we can then derive the overall assurance. Therefore by referring to Figure 1 , we state the CoE A as the ToE. Since, the CoE A is associated with two additional components, CoE B and CoE C , which represent the associated components set (ACS A ) of the CoE A and are additionally connected with other components. The overall assurance in this case has to be recursively aggregated from the leafs of the tree (i.e. by aggregating all ACS (ACS B , ACS C and ACS F ). Therefore we will use tree traversal post order method to iteratively walk through the tree. For the first use case, we just refer to the concept of the tree traversal post order method as a tool for our concept. This method is slightly extended by integrating our Assurance Level Calculation Procedure (ALCP) from Figure 3 using recursively aggregate assurance.
The assurance level of the referenced ACS (ACS F , ACS B and ACS C , respectively), by applying the ALCP aligned with the equation (8) . The procedure sequentially conducts bitwise conjunction of individual SPs for each CoE across each ACS. Depending on the result of conjunction (1 or 0) it is decided if all SPVs are discarded with the bit that matches the result of the conjunction. For example, by discarding certain SPVs we 
are indirectly discarding those ALs that are not fulfilling the current set of SPs for particular ACS. The next step is to map the suitable ACS AL , according to the Table 2 , towards the appropriate DAL VS . The DAL VS is not only used for mapping the calculated ACS AL , but also to customize the underlying security properties of a particular AL. Finally, we calculate the AL of the root CoE for a particular ACS, equation (9), depending on the SPs that the CoE corresponds to the AL of the ACS whereby the equations (10) and have to be fulfilled. However, in case of multiple ACs per CoE we have to consider equation (12) where we consider the AL of individual ACs to determine consolidated ALs for a CoE. Table 2 : Assurance Level per distinct Assurance classes depicted with Hexadecimal vectors. We define minimal assurance level requirements (DALVS) of the objects that are in direct relationship with the parent object. It also defines the assurance level requirements per level of the parent object itself, ALVS. Additionally we define the minimum requirement for each AC in terms of AL, i.e. we define at which assurance level individual AC has to satisfy to define the overall assurance of the object. In case when we have multiple AC to consider in order to derive the overall AL we use the Consolidated Assurance Level (CAL). 
D. General Tree Model
A general tree G is a finite compound set of nodes such that there is only one designated node R, referred as root of the tree G, where each individual node has only one ancestor (Parent) node, with exception of the root, and multiple successors (Children). Each node of the tree is defined by two properties: Depth and Degree. Depth of the node is the distance of the node from the root node, and Degree of the node is the number of successors for a particular node. Moreover, each general tree can be partitioned in n > 0 disjoint subsets T 0 , T 1 , T 2 … T n-1 , where each is a tree whose roots R 0 , R 1 , R 2 … R n-1 are children of the tree G. The subset Ti (0 i n) is a subset of the trees of T.
Although we intent to depict our services through a general tree based model, they can be also depicted via the binary tree model, since the general tree model is easily transformed to A binary tree. For demonstrational purpose of our algorithm (Figure 3) we will use the general tree model. Since the model can be easily transformed, our implementation can be adopted to apply the algorithm on binary trees as well. However, we will not address the assessment of binary trees as it exceeds the scope of this work.
IV. EVALUATION
The introduced approach is evaluated and explained in more details using two scenarios. As first step, the cyber-risks that exist in the use case scenario have to be understood alongside the security properties that need to be assessed and certified.
Perceptions of risk in the context of Cloud computing have to be well understood since they will inevitably influence decisions about the adoption of Clouds or the security controls that will be applied to them. Two important factors that must be taken into consideration for a better understanding of cybersecurity risks are: (i) the threats and their likelihood to occur; and (ii) the vulnerabilities and an indication of their severity. A key challenge when understanding the risks associated with Cloud computing is to determine those that are specific to the use of Clouds. Therefore, in order to comprehend the C of our scenario we use the Cloud vulnerab SECCRIT project [4] has developed, in whi the Notorious Nine Top threats from CSA the help of the CUMULUS project's catalogue [2] , we map these vulnerabilities properties for their assessment. The basis the identification of a number of categorie focus directly on Cloud-related issues. T categories is based on the NIST essentia characteristics [3] . (8) . The procedure does the bitwise significant bit and based on the result decides whether have 0 or 1 assigned to a particular bit that is being during each iteration, the procedure checks if the rema a particular component are a subset of one of the ve particular ALi, as shown in Table 1 , for a particular AC
A. Use Caseses
The aim of the evaluation is to illus scenario via the abstraction of a general t used to assure the public safety of cri services and assesses the assurance acco security classes/properties. We refer in pa studies from the SECCRIT project [4] in o approach and make a proof of concept asses To demonstrate our algorithm we abstra use case scenarios explained below implemented our assurance algorithm in randomly define properties of evaluation tree, degree of a node, security property Furthermore, our implementation method i order tree traversal model in order to effic assurance of service by traversing the tree to in respect to assurance policies.
For the first use case scenario, the Depth is 1, meaning that we have only a root wit Degree (D 2 ) will be N, generated rando (Figure 2 (a) ). In the second use case both properties are predefined, e.g. D 1 =3 and D Within the second use case we want t begin procedure:
Cloud-specific risks bility catalogue the ich we then mapped A [1] . Further, with security property to possible security of this catalogue is es that enable us to The core of these l Cloud computing CP) for associated objects conjunction of the most r to discard the SPV that g analysed. Furthermore, aining vectors that define ector sets associated to a Ck strate a real world tree model. This is itical infrastructure ording to a set of articular to the case order to abstract our ssment algorithm. act a service via the w. Moreover, we n Java so we can such as depth of a y vector bit length. is founded on postciently evaluate the o aggregate security h (D 1 ) of the tree T 1 th a set of children, omly, as shown in h degree and depth D 2 =3 (Figure 2 (b) ). to demonstrate the application of our algorithm in a which would illustrate the service
B. Security Properties, Vulnerabil
The SECCRIT case studies con the authorisation of users, data s Figure 4 we present the archit components in different levels, as Moreover, some relevant security each component that needs to be c whole service. Table 3 presents a number of relevant for the case study, their s well as the vulnerabilities and thre them. Moreover, the dependencies also provided according to Figur selected four properties, e.g. SP_ proceed to the evaluation of our ap our on-going research on multi-la policies.
C. Scenario based assessment
To demonstrate the approach use cases: the fundamental gener more complex general tree, more realistically.
lities and Threats nsider mainly risks related to storage and data leakage. In tecture of the system with s well as their dependencies. y properties are mapped to certified in order to assure the ies across various architecture layers wards the SECCRIT vulnerability alogue. Due to the fact that both properties we only illustrated most l provide more detailed catalogue in f security properties that are security property category, as eats that are related to each of s between these properties are e 4. From this list we have _7, SP_4, SP_6 and SP_1 to pproach, as a starting point of ayer assurance dependencies we distinguish two specific ral tree model (illustrated in e model (illustrated in Figure  ervice through a general tree ode represents a standalone e that is being evaluated. entified security properties to istinguishing the four most P_6 and SP_1 assigning them as SP 4 , SP 3 , SP 2 and SP 1 respectively. We implemented a random bit vector generator that generates four bit sets, regardless of the use case, and associates them with individual SPV for a particular object. Table  4 (a). We use the traversal post order method to recursively assess the use case scenarios. Due to the simplicity of the first use case scenario the traversal post order method only determines the sequence of the evaluated objects, which is {B, C, D … N} since we have a one-level deep tree. Consolidating this with our procedural algorithm from Figure 3 we conduct bitwise conjunction. In particular we start by conducting the procedure illustrated in equation (8) and implemented in our algorithm in Figure 3 on the SP 4 . The result of this is 0. This indicates that according to Table 1 we discard all potential combination that fulfil SP 4 (upper eight combination [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] ) and reduce to 3-bit vector set for further evaluation. Our next sequential step, applies the same process on SP 3 resulting also to 0, which also lead to the same outcome, but reducing it into 2-bit vector. The next iteration for the SP 3 resulted to 1 that maps the remaining bit vector sets towards the assurance level two, therefore making the last bit irrelevant for the assurance since both potential outcomes (0 and 1) would lead towards assurance level two. Hence, the final vector, according to Table 1 , associates the underlying Associated component set (ACS) of the root node with AL=2 is SPV = [001X]. This process is derived for each AC until we derive the final SPVi for each ACi. The final aggregation towards the root is defined with equation (8), which leverages the policies of Table 2 to decide whether both conditions of the DAL VS and AL VS are satisfied to determine the root assurance level (the equations (9, (10 and (11 have to be fulfilled.), In this particular case this is CoE A (AL)=2. However, in case of multiple ACs it has to be also checked weather for each AC the minimum CAL is satisfied to fulfil a particular AL, as stated in Table 2 and defined by equation (12). To evaluate the second use case, i.e. the advanced tree model (see Figure 2-b) , we generate for each COE i , i ‫א‬ {A, B, C, D…N} SPVi Table 4 (b). Due to the fact that the first use case tree is a subset of the tree in the second use case, we can apply the whole process conducted in the first use case scenario iteratively, until we aggregate the assurance towards the root. Therefore, in order to avoid redundancy we will just refer to the process explained in the first use case and extend it accordingly. The traversal post order method in the second use case, Figure 2 .b has the following sequence {D, F, L, M, N, G, B, H, C, I, J, K, D, A}. Therefore we marked 5 steps in Figure  2 b 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we present an assurance methodology for Cloud security properties. This will support Cloud users in simplifying the assessment on whether a specific security level (i.e. assurance level) of a service can be maintained despite churn in the substitute components. The method supports multi-tenant environments and multi-layer environments. The scheme has been applied to two scenarios. This theoretic evaluation method shows efficient application of the proposed assurance assessment method over the use case where we demonstrate how services can be assessed according to a set of security properties with a defined set of policies.
Based on this work the next steps will provide a complete assurance class and security property catalogue that comprehensively covers the different aspects of Cloud environments. Furthermore, we are planning to use real-world applications from the SECCRIT and CUMULUS projects and benchmark them using the introduced scheme. As far as the model itself is concerned we will also further investigate the use of a binary tree model instead of the currently used general tree model, since we can easily transform a general tree to a binary tree model in order to empirically evaluate the performance of our algorithm.
